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‘Analysis of Business Groups: Some Observations with Reference to India’ but with has some 
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Abstract 
Through a critical review of some of the literature and making use of information relating to 
Indian groups, the case is made for a more bottom-up, and more historical, approach to the 
study of the developing country business group. The lack of clarity and unanimity in the 
conceptualization of the business group, the mismatch between many conceptions and the 
reality of Indian groups and how avoidable ignorance has led to mistaken conclusions are 
highlighted. Arguing that these problems stem from an excessive bias towards a top-down 
method of analyzing business groups, a shift in emphasis towards the concrete investigation 
of these groups, of their structures and working, and of their evolution over time, is urged. 
Keywords: business groups, developing countries, India 
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Studying Developing Country Business Groups: Some Issues with 
Reference to the Indian Case 
A fairy substantial body of literature has now developed which examines the origins 
and consequences of business groups in developing countries or ‘emerging markets’. The 
institution is studied from a variety of angles, and differences exist in perceptions about why 
groups exist and what effects they produce (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Two basic premises 
however seem to have unquestioned acceptance. These are: groups dominate the corporate 
and business landscape in many developing countries; and, the business group is a generic 
organizational form that is a distinct coordinating device relative to the standard firm. This 
paper questions the appropriateness of starting from such presuppositions and the broad 
methodological approach implied by their acceptance, using for that purpose information 
relating to the Indian case. The point being made is that the validity of these premises 
themselves needs to be examined against evidence, something that has not been done 
systematically. Instead, effectively assuming the results it would throw up deflects attention 
away from the research which would generate the evidence necessary for this examination. 
This is the detailed, concrete investigations of business groups in different countries, of their 
structures and working, and of their evolution over time. Making generalized conjectures 
about emerging market business groups without such a foundation cannot be considered a 
methodologically sound approach. Yet there appears to be a tendency to do precisely that. 
The larger conclusion emerging out of this paper therefore is that a more bottom-up, and 
more historical, approach to the study of business groups is needed than appears to be 
prevalent. 
That the case for such reorienting of the analysis of business groups is not a trivial one 
is demonstrated in what follows. The first section focuses on the question of the 
conceptualization of the business group. The lack of clarity and unanimity about precisely 
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what constitutes a business group, and the mismatch between many conceptions and the 
reality of Indian groups, are highlighted. This serves to drive home the point that the 
‘emerging-market business group’ may be an over-abstract concept. The second section of 
the paper then illustrates, with two cases drawn from the literature, how an excessive bias 
towards a top-down approach can be fatal for the analysis undertaken. In both, avoidable 
ignorance of Indian reality is shown to be culprit.  The major implications of the discussion in 
these two sections are then laid out in the concluding section at the end of the paper. 
What is a Business Group? 
The business group has been described as a proto-concept (Smangs 2006) and the 
absence of a commonly agreed upon definition of the institution has been recognized 
(Cuervo-Cazurra 2006). Notwithstanding their family resemblance to each other, different 
conceptions of the emerging market business group are far from being even approximately 
the same, let alone identical. Broadly speaking, these definitions zero in on some combination 
of four different attributes to demarcate business groups. The first is their multi-company 
structure – that they consist of a number of companies which are legally independent entities 
but whose activities are nevertheless coordinated. The second is their conglomerate character, 
a simultaneous engagement in a diverse set of often unrelated businesses. A third is that 
business groups are associated with concentration in ownership and control. Finally, the role 
that social networks based on family and other social ties, between individuals owning, 
controlling, and managing the constituent businesses or companies of the group, play in 
imparting cohesion to a group is also sometimes stressed.  
Leff (1978) had included almost all of these features in his early definition of the 
developing country business group. Subsequent formulations however have departed from 
Leff in two directions. Either some rather than all these features have been considered 
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important or subtle shifts in the specific meaning given to a particular feature have been 
introduced. Amsden and Hikino (1994) for instance took conglomerate diversification as the 
most important feature of the business group and made no reference to the multi-company 
form. The most important amendment of the second kind relates to the interpretation of the 
multi-company nature of the group. In Leff each business group was an individual multi-
company firm. But following Granovetter (1994 and 1995) business groups tend to be seen as 
collections of firms that occupy a somewhat intermediate position between the firm and the 
market, as a “hybrid organizational form” (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007, p. 333). Leff had 
emphasized the role that participation of many families in a group played in pooling capital 
because of the limited development of separation of ownership and control. He did not 
therefore insist, as some more recent formulations have (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), on the 
multiplicity of public companies as a characteristic feature of the group.  
If there is a common thread that runs through the different definitions of the business 
group, it would probably be the recognition of unrelated or conglomerate diversification as 
one of the important defining features of a group. Most explanations of the business group in 
developing countries (Leff, 1978; Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998, 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Guillen, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Jeon and Kim, 2004) 
also focus chiefly on this characteristic. The explicit connection between business groups and 
concentrated ownership is however drawn only occasionally (Khanna and Palepu, 2005; 
Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005).  
The Firm, the Market and the Group 
A multi-company structure can be the form taken by an individual firm or could be 
built around inter-firm coordination. Transnational firms with hundreds of affiliates and 
cartels may be considered respective examples outside of groups. Coordination within a 
multi-company firm is clearly however different from extra-market coordination between 
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firms, and the difference is not merely a matter of the degree of coordination. The former is 
fundamentally no different from coordination within a stand-alone company. Extra-market 
coordination between firms having an independent identity prior to and outside of that 
coordination is quite another thing. To the latter kind of cases would be extremely relevant 
the question Granovetter (1994, 1995) considered the most important one in relation to 
groups: how individual firms establish links between their activities? When the group is an 
individual firm, this would be a redundant question. Instead one has to ask: why and in what 
circumstances are firms induced to adopt a specifically multi-company form and modify its 
structure? It would follow that the business group as firm and as inter-firm structure are two 
very different entities.  
In India, the term business group has been basically used to describe a set of 
companies having a centralized common authority (Hazari, 1966). Its precursor was the 
managing-agency house, also a multi-company structure, which emerged in the 19
th
 century
1
. 
Individual multi-company groups or managing agency houses in India have not been the 
results of processes of otherwise independent companies coming together in some kind of a 
federal structure. Instead, they have always been deliberate creations of their single 
controlling authorities. Behind the set of companies constituting an Indian business group at 
any point of time, their structure of connections, and the evolution of the group structure over 
time, has always been the guiding hand of the central controlling authority of the group. Thus 
                                                          
1 The managing agency system involved the contractual vesting of the responsibility for 
managing the affairs of a company to a managing agency, which could be a 
proprietorship/partnership firm or even a narrowly held joint-stock company. The system was 
often used to control a single company, but in a managing agency house many companies 
were managed by a single managing agency firm. 
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the Indian business group is simply a business firm given a multi-company rather than stand-
alone company form by its creator, and not really a hybrid organizational structure. In this 
regard it may be close to Leff’s conception of the group, but far from so in other senses.  
Families, Business Groups and Concentrated Ownership in India 
The use of the multi-company form in India has not been limited to Indian family 
business firms. European businessmen were the initial creators of the multiple-company 
managing agency houses in the 19
th
 century, at a time when most Indian businesses were 
single company firms (Rungta, 1970). Apart from such European controlled firms, some of 
whom survived till the 1970s, affiliates of foreign multinationals, government controlled 
enterprises, and even some of the few professionally managed enterprises in India have also 
assumed at times a multiple-company form. Amongst the top 70 odd largest ‘groups’ 
identified by the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (MIC) (Government of India, 1965) and 
the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (ILPIC) (Government of India, 1969) were 
European controlled ones like Andrew Yule and Gillanders Arbuthnot, and those like ICI and 
Swedish Match which were multinational affiliates. Subsequently, other multinationals like 
Unilever and British American Tobacco (BAT) also had multiple companies, as did 
professionally-managed Larsen & Toubro. Andrew Yule, taken over by the government in 
the 1970s, and the Gujarat Fertilizers group have been government-controlled groups. 
Before independence, and for a period after that, different Indian business families did 
exhibit a high degree of collaboration and cohesion in their actual business operations. Multi-
company group structures did not however have to serve as the enabling device for this, and 
existed quite independently. Collaboration gave rise to: individual companies that were joint-
ventures between two or more otherwise distinct groups or; groups in which more than one 
family jointly constituted the single controlling authority rather than individual companies 
belonging to different families; and sub-groups working in coordination with their dominant 
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family groups (Hazari, 1966; Government of India, 1965; Government of India, 1969). Over 
time, however, the cohesion provided by ties within and between families also came to be 
increasingly undermined. Internecine squabbles between collaborating families were 
followed by divisions within firms controlled by single families to the extent that there is 
hardly any Indian business group of significance today which has not experienced one or 
more division. Instead of social and family ties providing the glue for bringing independent 
firms into a common structure, the breaking up of originally single firms has been the more 
prominent aspect of family control over business firms in India. The different parts emerging 
from such partitions often themselves have had a multi-company group form or subsequently 
spawned one. In the case of one group which has remained free of the problem of division 
and also always been amongst the largest, the Tata group, the family in fact has been very 
small.  
The multi-company group form in India has therefore not been an institution that is 
exclusively or primarily built around large networks of family and other social ties. Indian 
business families, in sharp contrast to Leff’s conception, have also not been major 
contributors of the capital to the enterprises controlled by them. 
In India, private sector companies have for long generally relied on external funds for 
financing their growth
2
. Banks and financial institutions (mainly public sector for a long 
                                                          
2
 The private corporate sector in the aggregate has been persistently a savings-deficit 
sector in India with the dependence on external savings tending to be greater in periods of 
relatively high corporate investment (mid-1950s to mid-1960s, the 1980s through to the mid-
1990s, and since 2002-03). The regular Reserve Bank of India (RBI) studies on company 
finances appearing in the RBI Bulletin also show a substantial dependence of private sector 
companies on external financing. In the most recent phase of high corporate investment this 
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stretch of time) have been the main fillers of this financing gap, accounting for over three-
fourths of such funds for the last three decades and more than half in the three decades of the 
post-independence period prior to that (Reserve Bank of India, 2000 and 2007). Thus, those 
controlling business groups have neither been typically the source of external funds and often 
not even performed the function of pooling them.   
Even what might be considered the share of the controlling business families in the 
internal sources of their companies has not been very high in India. The direct holdings of 
equity by such families, the only part to acquire which they would have had to provide funds, 
have tended to typically become small over time and with increase in company size. 
However, there has been a difference between the shareholding owned and that controlled by 
these families, the latter being usually much larger. The multi-company structure has allowed 
recourse to the device of what in India have been called inter-corporate investments, the 
holding of equity in companies by other companies (Hazari, 1966; Goyal, 1979; Singhania, 
1980; Rao, 1985). Of such equity whose immediate ownership is vested in companies, those 
controlling them are not the ultimate owners. In fact group inter-corporate investments create 
fictitious share capital. They give rise to mutually cancelling out liabilities and assets for the 
group as a whole – the equity held by any one group company being a claim on other group 
companies.  Such internally held share capital would therefore disappear if the group 
companies were to be consolidated into a single company. 
In relation to the corporate sector, concentrated ownership can describe two kinds of 
concentration - a) in the distribution pattern of equity ownership of companies; and b) in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dependence was a little less, though still rising. Partly this was because of the growing 
importance in the Indian corporate sector of informational technology companies which have 
high profits but relatively low levels of investment. 
STUDYING DEVELOPING COUNTRY BUSINESS GROUPS 
 
9 
 
distribution of corporate assets between firms, or aggregate concentration. Both have been 
characteristic features of the Indian corporate sector, but not because a few large family 
networks have been the main sources of financing business ventures. The former 
concentration has been instead the result of companies and institutions, both Indian and 
foreign, dominating ownership of corporate securities. Aggregate concentration on the other 
hand has been facilitated by the separation of ownership and control of capital, with 
concentration in the control being the result of the allocation pattern of finance through 
markets and intermediaries. The prevalence of multi-company firm structures has certainly 
meant that the actual level of aggregate concentration in India has been higher than that 
indicated by the degree of concentration in the size distribution of companies. However, 
unlike what may be true if groups were devices of inter-firm coordination, there is no causal 
connection between the two in the Indian case
3
. Why capital is concentrated in a few firms is 
a different question from why these firms distribute the capital commanded by them between 
many companies.  
Business Groups and Diversification 
A link between conglomerate diversification and the multi-company attribute of 
groups is likely only when a group is a coalition of different individual firms engaged in 
different businesses. Individual companies can always have a conglomerate diversification 
pattern and have multiple divisions. Many companies are therefore not required by a single 
firm to organize a variety of businesses. On the other hand if a single firm does assume a 
multi-company character, it could choose to have more than a single company in the same 
                                                          
3
 Morck et al (Morck, Wolfenszon and Yeung, 2005) seem to have said otherwise, 
indicating that concentration is greater with multi-company groups than if companies were 
stand-alone.  
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industry. Thus, for such firms, their diversification pattern and their multi-company form are 
distinct phenomenon. 
Groups or managing agency houses having many companies operating in the same 
industry has been an old phenomenon in India (Lokanathan, 1935; Mehta, 1952; Kothari, 
1967). More prevalent perhaps in an earlier era in the textile industries, it has not entirely 
disappeared even today (Table 1). There are also umpteen contemporary examples of highly 
diversified individual companies. For instance, Grasim Industries, one of the many AV Birla 
group companies, alone has the following business segments – Fibre and Pulp (Viscose 
Staple Fibre and Rayon Grade Pulp); Chemicals (Caustic Soda and Allied Chemicals); 
Cement; Sponge iron; Textiles (Fabrics and yarn); and Others.  Similarly, the revenues of 
ITC, not a family controlled company but an affiliate of the BAT group with a professional 
Indian management, are derived from a variety of products – Cigarettes, Printed Materials, 
Agri Products (Edible Oils, Rice, Coffee), Marine Products, Paperboards and Paper, 
Packaged Foods, Hotels, and Others (Branded Garments, Matches, Stationery Products, 
Personal care Products, etc.). 
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Table 1: Illustrative List of Cases of Multiple Group Companies in the Same Industry, 2005-06 
Product / Industry Group 
Number of 
Companies 
in the 
industry 
Market Share of: 
Largest 
Single 
group co. 
All group 
cos. 
Cement Holcim- Gujarat Ambuja 2 11.25 22.00 
Cement Birla AV 4 11.65 22.28 
Aluminium Foils Birla AV 2 37.45 42.17 
Animal Feeds Godrej 2 11.30 20.30 
Axle Shafts Kalyani 2 32.03 51.37 
Beer UB 3 39.62 77.41 
Wines, Spirits and Liquors UB 2 35.78 53.01 
Ethylene Glycol Reliance 2 45.80 74.13 
Polyester Filament Yarn Reliance 3 36.30 47.14 
Linear Alkyl Benzene Reliance 2 31.99 48.88 
Polyester Staple Fibre Reliance 2 59.36 69.35 
Poly Vinyl Chloride Reliance 2 35.04 56.68 
Floor & Wall tiles Somany Enterprises 2 10.93 18.20 
Glass Hollowares Somany Enterprises 2 28.02 40.09 
PVC Pipes &Fittings Kisan 3 5.10 12.80 
Source: Derived from Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), Market Size and Shares, 
2007 
Even more notable is the fact that the extent and nature of their diversification has 
varied significantly across multi-company groups at any point of time and also across time in 
the case of individual groups. The data available from the MIC Report (Government of India, 
1965) for example reveals that there were many groups in the 1960s that were mainly textile-
based groups even as others were highly diversified. Groups that grew into large ones at a 
later point of time, like Om Prakash Jindal, Gujarat Ambuja, Ispat, Onida, and many 
pharmaceutical based groups like Ranbaxy have steadily remained relatively specialised 
ones. The Reliance group emerged as one of India's largest groups before liberalization 
through a growth sequence that remained focused on a set of related industries (synthetic 
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textiles and fibres, and petrochemicals) and it diversified into unrelated activities (power, 
telecom, retail, financial businesses, construction, etc.) only in the 1990s and after.  This 
evidence thus indicates that while some multi-company firms in India at any point of time 
have a highly diversified character; it is not always true of every such firm at all points of 
time and even for extended periods of time. 
The Architecture of Indian Business Groups 
The multi-company firm is a generic expression that conveys nothing about the nature 
and numbers of companies constituting a group, and their placing in relation to each other 
within the group structure. In India, group architectures have been actually quite varied.  
The legal entities that have been the objects of a common centralized control in the 
Indian business world have been varied - companies with shares publicly traded on stock 
exchanges, narrowly held companies not listed on exchanges, and even partnership and 
proprietary firms. One dimension of variation between multi-company firms has been the 
numbers of each of these different kinds of entities and the pattern of distribution of assets 
between them
4
. A contemporary indication of this diversity is provided by the number of 
publicly listed companies that different groups have – which range from a single one to 
                                                          
4
 Amongst the 75 large groups in 1964 identified by the MIC, the total number of 
companies ranged from a mere 4 or 5 in some cases to as many as 151 in the case of the Birla 
group. The Birla group had 54 companies that were reasonably large individually (i.e. with 
assets more than Rs. 1 crore) while the other amongst the two largest groups, Tata, had 27. 
As many as 5 groups however had only one such company and another 11 had only two. In 
the case of the Birla group, less than 8% of its total assets were accounted for by the largest 
company in the group. There were also however many groups with a single company 
accounting for over 90% of total group assets. 
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numbers in double digits.  If the multiple public company criteria were to be strictly applied, 
then many of those classified as group affiliated companies in the standard databases used by 
researchers
5
 would not qualify as groups. On the other hand if  a simple multi-company 
criteria were adopted, many Indian private companies that are not classified as group 
affiliated in the same databases and therefore assumed by most to be stand-alone companies, 
would become group affiliated.  
In fact, amongst public companies in India the pure stand-alone company is relatively 
rare. This is revealed by the common presence in the promoter’s stake (what is admitted as 
the part of the company’s equity controlled by those who manage it) of the holdings of other 
companies. Table 2 shows that in a sample of 171 listed companies that were not classified as 
being attached to any group in the Prowess database
6
 not only is a high level of the 
promoter’s stake very common, more than half the companies also reported other companies 
among their controlling group of shareholders. Even amongst companies where the 
promoter’s stake is held entirely by individuals, one can find cases like that of three India 
Bulls companies where the promoter shareholders are common and who therefore have a 
common controlling authority. 
Not only are pure stand-alone companies rare in India, even when they exist they do 
not necessarily remain so forever. The MIC as well as the ILPIC had in the 1960s identified 
                                                          
5
 The Prowess of the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) is the most 
commonly used. 
6
 These include all such companies included in the BSE-500 index and additional 
stand-alone companies with assets greater than Rs. 500 crores in 2006-07. Companies 
included in the BSE-500 account for over 93% of the transactions on the Bombay Stock-
Exchange. 
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many that the latter called large independent companies, which were large stand-alone 
companies, many of whom were larger than some of the groups they had identified 
(Government of India,1965 and 1969). Subsequently, because of the discovery of other 
companies affiliated to them or because of the floating of additional companies by their 
controlling authorities, these companies acquired the character of groups. Examples of such 
groups are Godrej, Escorts, Larsen & Toubro, Mohan Meakins, Rohit, and Chowgule. 
In multi-company firms each company can perform either one or both roles – it can be 
the legal entity through which one or more business activities are undertaken and it can be the 
holder of shares in other group companies. The arrangement of these functions between 
different companies also shows great variety amongst Indian groups. In some cases these two 
functions are more clearly demarcated between typically narrowly held investment 
companies and public companies respectively while in others public and private companies 
may simultaneously perform both functions
7
. In some groups, all the businesses of the firm 
may be concentrated in a single company while in others they may be distributed between a 
great many. There are also significant variations in the pattern of inter-corporate investments 
between group companies. A set of narrowly held investment companies sharing the holding 
of a controlling stake in one major company is one simple form. At the other end could be an 
extremely complex structure of different companies of different types being connected 
through chains of such investments, of both linear and circular varieties, with any single 
company being simultaneously part of many separate chains of both types (Hazari, 1966; 
Singhania, 1980).  
 
                                                          
7
 The Tata group is a case in point (Chalapati Rao and Guha, 2006). 
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Table 2: Promoter’s Share in ‘Stand-Alone’ Companies in India (As on 30 June 2008) 
Threshold 
Level 
Number of Companies in Sample with Share Greater than Threshold 
Level of: 
Promoters Total 
Holding in Total 
Equity 
Promoter Group 
Bodies Corporate in 
Total Equity 
Bodies Corporate in 
Total Promoter Group 
Equity 
More than 50% 76 11 56 
More than 40% 101 17 65 
More than 30% 128 34 74 
More than 20% 154 55 84 
More than 10% 164 71 97 
More than 0% 171 111 111 
0% 0 60 60 
Source: Bombay Stock Exchange (http://www.bseindia.com), Shareholding Patterns 
The structures of individual firms, as illustrated by the case of independent companies 
turning into groups, are also variable across time. An interesting example of such variations is 
provided by the Reliance group. Before the public listing of Reliance Industries in 1977, the 
group had incorporated six companies, none of which was listed on any stock exchange and 
whose shares were held by mainly members of the controlling family. The 
manufacturing/processing activities were spread between four of these companies. After that 
there was a rapid proliferation in the number of companies of the group in the 1980s, mostly 
for holding the shares of what was the sole publicly listed company of the group for over a 
decade. The group’s manufacturing activities and productive assets also came to be 
concentrated in this one company. Currently, the two factions of the group have about 10 
companies listed on stock exchanges. Depending upon the specific definition used for a 
business group, one could thus arrive at different conclusions about when Reliance was a 
group and when not. 
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The Perils of a Top-Down bias: Two Illustrative Cases 
The two cases discussed in this section are representative of two very different 
outlooks on business groups. They however share the common feature of misreading the 
evidence to support their position, the proximate cause in both instances being inadequate 
acquaintance with the reality of Indian groups. This unfamiliarity, and the willingness to 
arrive at conclusions in the face of it, is not limited to these two cases and should be 
attributed to the tendencies inherent in a top-down methodology rather than simple ignorance 
or carelessness.  
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan: Tunneling Amongst Indian Groups 
Bertrand et al (2000 and 2002) set out to find evidence of tunneling amongst Indian 
groups, to quantify its extent, and to identify its mechanism. The phenomenon of tunneling 
refers to the transfer of profits, at the expense of other shareholders, by those controlling the 
group from companies where they have lower cash flow rights to those where these rights are 
greater. The feature of the Indian business group Bertrand et al were concerned with was 
consequently the multi-company structure with a common centralized control.  
The basic method Bertrand et al relied on was a comparison of the responses of group 
affiliated companies and stand-alones in a sample data set to profit shocks in their own and 
other industries. The extent of deviation of their actual from predicted (average industry) 
responses was used for this purpose. The lower responsiveness of group affiliated companies 
to such profit shocks in their own industries and greater responsiveness to that in other 
industries was treated as the evidence of tunneling. It was also found that this tunneling was 
operating entirely through the non-operating profits. 
The fundamental problem with the method used by Bertrand et al was in its twin 
premises: that tunneling could happen only from public companies classified as belonging to 
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groups but not in stand-alones; and that the difference in their responsiveness to profit shocks 
could only be on account of this. In the process two critically important facts related to the 
multi-company structure of the Indian group were ignored.  
The first of these is that the multi-company structure with uneven cash flow rights is 
always a deliberate creation, and the option of creating such a structure is open to the 
management of any firm. The simplest way of doing so for anyone controlling a public 
company would be to create a parallel narrowly held private limited company. We have seen 
earlier that even companies that are apparently stand-alones often have such affiliated 
companies. In such circumstances, logically the tendency towards tunneling should exist in 
equal measure in all public companies whether group affiliated or stand-alone. The separation 
of the two kinds of companies in the sample could also have been more notional than real, 
reflecting only the exclusion of the narrowly held affiliated companies of many ‘stand-
alones’ on account of these not being public companies. Both imply that there is no basis for 
evidence of tunneling and its quantum to be revealed by comparing the responsiveness to 
profit-shocks of stand-alone or group-affiliated companies. 
The second feature that was not taken into account is the connections between 
companies through inter-corporate investments. These provide channels for transmission of 
profit shocks independent of tunneling if dividend payments have a positive relationship with 
profits. Moreover, it is precisely in non-operating profits that dividends received by 
companies from their equity holdings in other companies would appear. 
If the above two facts are taken into account and a reasonable assumption is made that 
the sample Bertrand et al used consisted of only public companies, their results can be  
explained without any link to tunneling. For this let us use a simple numerical example. 
Consider two ‘groups’, A and B, each having two companies, 1 and 2. Let these companies 
be called A1, A2, B1 and B2 respectively. Let A1 be a public company in which A2, a 
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narrowly held investment company, holds 40% of the equity. Let B1 and B2 be public 
companies involved in separate industries, with B1 being in the same industry as A1. Assume 
that B1 and B2 hold 40% of each other’s equity, but the personal holding of the group 
controllers is greater in B2. With these specifications, Group’s A and B can be said to 
respectively represent in simplified form the typical ‘stand alone’ and the typical ‘group’ in 
India. In a sample consisting of only public companies, A1 would be designated as an 
unaffiliated firm while both companies of Group B would be group affiliated. A2 would of 
course not be part of the sample. 
Now let us assume that each of the public companies make operating profits of Rs. 
100 each in a year and pay 50% of these as dividends to their shareholders. Inclusive of these 
dividends, the profits of the 4 companies if there is no tunneling would be as shown in 
Situation 1 of Case 1 (assuming there is no other non-operating income). Let us also consider 
a Case 2 where we assume in addition that both groups indulge in tunneling to the same 
degree by transferring 10% of the actual operating profits from the more widely held to the 
more narrowly held company. In this case, the profits that the companies would show would 
be slightly different. Now let us see what happens if there is a 20% average increase in 
operating profits in the industry in which A1 and B1 operate and both companies reflect this, 
while all other industries situation remains unchanged. The revised positions would be as 
depicted by Situation 2s of the two cases. In both cases, since for B1 the increase was on a 
larger base which included the dividend income from its holding in B2, its ‘responsiveness’ 
to the profit shock would be less than of A1. On the other hand, B2 would reflect the profit 
shock in Industry 1 because of greater dividend income even though there is no change 
within its own industry. Thus precisely the same combination of results that Bertrand et al got 
as proof of tunneling by ‘groups’ can be obtained when neither indulges in tunneling as well 
as when both do. 
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Table 3: Illustration of Effects of Profit Shocks with and without Tunneling 
 
Group Profit Category 
Situation 1 Situation 2 
Percentage Change after 
Profit Shock 
Values Before Profit Shock Values After Profit Shock 
Company 1 Company 2 Company 1 Company 2 Company 1 Company 2 
Case 1 (No Tunneling) 
Group A Operating Profit 100 20 120 24 20.00 20.00 
Group B 
Operating Profit 100 100 120 100 20.00 0.00 
Total Profit 120 120 140 124 16.67 3.33 
Non-Operating 
Profit 
20 20 20 24 0.00 20.00 
Case 2 (With Tunneling) 
Group A Operating Profit 90 28 108 33.6 20.00 20.00 
Group B 
Operating Profit 90 110 108 112 20.00 1.82 
Total Profit 112 128 130.4 133.6 16.43 4.38 
Non-Operating 
Profit 
22 18 22.4 21.6 1.82 20.00 
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Khanna and Palepu: Instability amongst Leading Groups 
Khanna and Palepu (2005) argued that concentration in India has been accompanied 
by substantial instability in the concentrated owners, and therefore at least in the Indian case 
the fears of entrenchment appear to be unwarranted. In substantiation they pointed towards 
the sharp difference in the composition of the top fifty business groups at two points of time, 
1969 and 1997. According to their examination of the data they presented, as many as 43 of 
the top 50 groups in 1997 were not in the same list in 1969. As illustrative of the importance 
of innovative ability to the success of business groups, they also mentioned a story about the 
Reliance group which they took from another source
8
. 
“...Dhirubhai Ambani single-handedly mobilized small investors around the country 
in 1977 and listed on the Bombay and Ahmedabad stock exchanges when the dominant 
public financial institutions would not lend him capital.” (Khanna and Palepu, 2005, p. 301) 
Unfortunately, the second story is a bit of a fiction while the former result is a gross 
exaggeration of the element of instability in Indian big business that does not follow from 
even the data Khanna and Palepu used. In reading this data, Khanna and Palepu failed to take 
account the following: 
i) The 1969 list (which actually pertains to 1966) is from the ILPIC report, 
which also included a list of large independent companies. Of the ‘groups’ in the top fifty in 
1997, some were from amongst these companies, and therefore were not ‘new’ constituents 
of Indian big business 
ii) Between the 1960s and the 1990s, many of the groups had split and it is one or 
more of their splinters that appear in the 1999 list. Two cases are of the opposite kind – 
                                                          
8
 The source cited is India Unbound: From Independence to the Global Information 
Age by Gurcharan Das. 
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groups that were separate ones in 1966 being consolidated into single groups by 1999. For 
these and other reasons, some groups simply appear under slightly or very different names in 
the two lists. In other words, the ‘old’ dropping out from the list and the ‘new’ entering into it 
are in many cases actually the same.  
iii) Some groups that were large in the 1960s did get somehow overlooked when 
the ILPIC or the MIC finalized their list of groups and large companies. Their appearance in 
the 1997 list therefore again does not represent the ‘new’ element. 
Table 4 provides a mapping across the two points of time between groups appearing 
in the 1966 and 1997 lists used by Khanna and Palepu. It shows that 31 of the top fifty in 
1997, and 21 of those in 1966, were ‘survivors’ over the interim period9. 
A contradiction of the story on Reliance can be found in the relevant annual reports of 
Reliance Industries (then known as Reliance Textile Industries). In the period before 1977, 
Reliance Textile Industries was a private limited company whose growth was mainly debt-
financed. The outstanding debt liabilities in 1975-76 show that public sector banks and ICICI 
were its major creditors
10
. In fact even before Reliance Textile Industries became a public 
company, ICICI became a minority shareholder in it. In 1976-77 Reliance Textile Industries also 
made arrangements with financial institutions for term loans to finance a substantial part of its 
                                                          
9
 Amongst those that did not survive were a number of European controlled groups 
that were subsequently Indianized. 
10
 ICICI is presently a private sector bank. It was originally however a publicly 
sponsored industrial development bank which though created in the private sector with shares 
held by banks, insurance companies, and international financial institutions, became 
effectively a government company with the nationalization of banks and insurance. 
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proposed expansion project. The financial commitments made by the institutions amounted to 
Rs. 857 lakhs, nearly 69% of  the total project cost of Rs. 1250 lakhs and nearly half of the value 
of the company’s assets at that time, including foreign currency loans of Rs 239 lakhs.  All the 
major public sector financial institutions - IDBI, IFCI, ICICI, UTI, LIC and GIC and its 
subsidiaries were involved in this arrangement. Far from being starved of funds by them, the 
Reliance group appears to have succeeded in securing significant support from public sector 
financial institutions and banks at a fairly early stage in its history.  
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Table 4: Mapping of Groups, 1966 and 1997 
Group(s)/Company in 1966 Matching Group(s) in 1997 
Tata 
Tata ACC 
Rallis 
Birla 
BK-KM Birla 
KK Birla 
CK Birla 
SK Birla 
Thapar 
LM Thapar 
MM Thapar 
Mafatlal Arvind Mafatlal 
Walchand Vinod Doshi 
Shriram SRF/A Bharat Ram 
JK Singhania 
Hari S Singhania 
Vijaypat Singhania 
Goenka 
RPG Enterprises 
GP Goenka 
Macneill and Barry Williamson Magor 
Lalbhai Lalbhai 
TVS TS Santhanam 
Kirloskar 
Kirloskar 
Kalyani 
Parry 
Murugappa Chettiar 
Murugappa 
Mahindra Mahindra 
Bajaj Bajaj 
Simpson Amalgamation 
Wadia Wadia 
Shaw Wallace Manu Chabria 
Were large in 1966 by ILPIC criteria but overlooked 
when list was finalized 
MAC 
UB Group 
Appeared as large independent companies in ILPIC 
List 
GE Shipping 
Godrej 
Escorts 
Hinduja 
 
But there is more to the story. According to the official statement by the company in its 
Annual Report for 1976-77, the public listing of the company was immediately prompted by the 
listing condition laid down by public financial institutions while granting assistance (which 
reflected the normal practice followed by these institutions that time). In order to comply with 
that condition, the then existing shareholders of Reliance Textile Industries offered a part of their 
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holding for sale to the public. That first public offer and the subscription to it thus did not in fact 
bring any additional finance into the company because it only amounted to a change of 
ownership of existing shares. Its success however may have helped reveal to the group the 
possibilities that existed, which they subsequently exploited successfully. 
Conclusions 
The main conclusions emerging from the above discussion may be summarized as 
follows. 
1) The literature on business groups in developing countries contains not one but 
many different conceptualizations of such groups. A short survey of them reveals that the 
different definitions of the developing country business group clearly use the same term to 
describe entities that are quite different from each other, even though they are supposedly 
talking of the same institution. Yet debate and discussion on which of these if any fits the 
reality, and the mustering of evidence for this, is conspicuous by its absence.   
2) Even before actually examining the evidence one could say that the 
differences in conceptions could reflect the real existence of even greater diversity in the 
attributes of groups across countries, within the same country, and over time.  Many of the 
basic attributes of groups highlighted by the different definitions of the business group clearly 
do not necessarily imply each other. Groups identified by a particular definition or attribute 
and those by others may not therefore exactly coincide. In addition, some attributes are 
clearly mutually contradictory– for instance group as firm and group as a structure of inter-
firm coordination. The same entity could also exhibit different combinations of attributes at 
different times in the course of its life history. Most conceptions of the business group ignore 
this possibility and implicitly treat the defining attributes of groups to be either their 
relatively stable features or those which they tend to acquire. 
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3) This scope for diversity amongst groups further underscores the importance of 
collecting evidence on the features actually exhibited by developing country business groups. 
If one had such evidence at hand, and chipped away at the features not found in all groups to 
try and isolate a common essence, we may find that none exists (except that they are all 
‘different’ from some idealized picture of a firm). Certainly the logical possibility of such a 
result, which would undermine the basis for a general theory of the developing country 
group, exists. Particularly important in this regard, because of the fundamental differences 
between them and the questions they throw up, is the need to check whether groups in their 
specific contexts are firms or coalitions of firms. This can only be done by examining the 
origins and nature of the connections within groups.  
4) The limited evidence of a single country, India, reinforces the above 
conclusions. The common essence, if any, of Indian groups has been that they are multi-
company firms. Multi-company structures have been omnipresent in India, even more than 
presumed. They have however neither been stable arrangements of coordination between 
different firms nor necessarily served as a mechanism of pooling the capital of many families. 
Rather individual firms have tended to assume this generic form, and retain it even while 
otherwise changing and transforming over time. Indian groups therefore have been more 
distant from groups based on inter-firm coordination than from the classic stand-alone firm. 
Yet they have exhibited tremendous diversity across space and time, and there is no obvious 
average pattern around which they have tended to cluster. None of the standard definitions of 
the group therefore accurately describes Indian groups. Attributes of groups emphasized in 
some of them have been entirely absent amongst Indian groups while others have been less 
common than presumed. 
5) The Indian case also illustrates how conceptual vagueness regarding business 
groups can affect empirical research on groups. A lot of this research relies on classification 
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of companies into group affiliated and independent companies in standard datasets.  Such 
classifications can be quite arbitrary, not based on any specific conception of the business 
group let alone the one being used by the researcher. This has however been blissfully 
ignored by many while using such datasets.  
6) The deficiencies in the conceptualization and analysis of the business group do 
not simply reflect the absence of information. They are also produced by a prevalent 
methodological approach that does not attach enough value to the essential task of putting 
together and sifting at least the basic relevant information on business groups and is prone to 
proceed from superficial observations to the construction of explanatory models. The study of 
business groups can only benefit from some reconsideration of this approach.   
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